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The annexation of the Philippines by the United States in the wake of the Spanish-
American War and subsequently by the Filipino-American War,1was justified by President William 
McKinley amidst vigorous opposition by anti-imperialist groups in the mainland as one of 
benevolence; the American mission in the Philippines was not of exploitation but of development, 
civilization, education and self-government. 
 
The process of civilization, during the American regime (and at any other time) is vague, to 
say the least. Education was a matter which almost entirely fell under the province of the 
executive branch of the government. Self-government was primarily legislated by the United 
States Congress: the Philippine Bill of 1902 set the legal framework for the eventual establishment 
of an all-Filipino Philippine Assembly in 1907, while the Jones Law of 1916 completely removed the 
Americans from the legislature by abolishing the Philippine Commission and creating the all-
Filipino Philippine Senate.  
 
Development, on the other hand, was something which had to be grappled with largely 
within the state institutions of the Philippines by its constituent parts, particularly by the executive 
and legislative departments.Due to the specific historical trajectory of the early American regime, 
manifested in the concentration of executive and legislative functions with the Philippine 
Commission after the Spooner Amendment transferred the administration of the Philippines from 
military to civilian hands in 1901, development in the archipelago appeared to have a unitary 
character. The Philippine Commission, under the large shadow of Governor (later Secretary of War 
and eventually, President) William Howard Taft, crafted a stable, albeit modest, development plan 
for the Philippines: 
 Getting the island economy moving after a half-decade of revolution 
against Spain and war against the United States; 
 Transforming Manila into a modern American city; 
 Extending and upgrading the range of government services; and 
 Blanketing the Philippines with “public improvements” intended to 
facilitate the tasks of government and support economic development 
(Golay, 1997, p. 112). 
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 The Filipino-American War was referred to in American texts of the period such as Captain John R.M. 





Still, the question of development  
he claimed his country’s purpose in the Philippines was to civilize, educate and uplift the 
Filipinos. At the same time, according to Frank Golay (1997), the United States wanted to rule the 
Philippines “on the cheap” (p. 112). Apart from an initial endowment of US$ 3 million for 
rehabilitation purposes after the bloody Filipino-American War that commenced in 1899, the 
United States Congress did not allocate any more funds for the direct supportof the Philippines.2 
Funds necessary for the maintenance of the American colonial administration of the Philippines 
had to be drawn from domestic sources (Luton, 1971). To make this possible, the U.S. Congress 
passed the Payne-Aldrich Act in 1909 and the Underwood-Simmons Act in 1913, which, in 
consonance with the Philippine Tariff Act passed by the insular government, effectively 
constituted a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the United States and her colony. The FTA ---
particularly, access to American markets for Philippine agricultural products--- was envisioned to 
create a level of economic growth in the Philippines sufficient to support the domestic 
government’s administrative program (Ybiernas, 2007, pp. 349-352). 
 
What this essay aims to prove is that American involvement in World War I, short-lived as 
it was from 1917 to 1918, produced lasting political and economic ramifications for the 
Philippines. American entry into World War I in 1917 served as an impetus for the accelerated 
growth of Filipino exports to the United States, with the U.S.-Philippines FTA as the main 
vehicle.Consequently, the war-induced prosperity emboldened Governor General Francis Burton 
Harrison (1913-1920) and his Filipino cohorts to radically alter the archipelago’s erstwhile 
conservative development policies (see below).  
 
The war-induced economic growth of 1917-1918 was fashioned by the Harrison 
administration as an important structural foundation of a long-term state-led national 
development program (see below), itself the main building block of Philippine independence from 
the United States; Harrison, in fact, labeled himself “the cornerstone of Philippine independence” 
(Harrison, 1922).When the experiment destructively failed as a result of the normalization of U.S.-
Philippines tradeafter the war, the new (conservative) American pro-consul, Governor General 
Leonard Wood (1921-1927) sought to institute an agenda for economic recovery that aimed to 
reverse the state-led national development program set in place by Harrison. 
 
Governor Wood’s attempts were met with stiff resistance from the Filipino leaders who 
were politically-invested in the state-led national development program.Their resistance exploded 
into the Cabinet Crisis of 1923, where all the Filipino members of the cabinet tendered their 
resignation in protest against Governor Wood’s political and economic agenda. 
Thus, this essay seeks to uncover the political and economic issues behind the Philippines’ 
struggle for recovery in the aftermath of World War I. It will be argued in this essay that the 
                                                          
2
 United States Vice President John Nance Garner, in his address to the joint session of the Philippine Senate 
and National Assembly in 1935, declared: 
(United States Senator Harry Hawes) advises me that in 35 years of American sovereignty, 
with the exception of $3,000,000 provided for the recuperation after the war, the entire 
cost of all civil administration has been provided by the revenues secured from the 
taxation of your people.  
See Annual Report of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands 1935 (Coverning the period January 1 to 
November 14), 1937. 
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Cabinet Crisis of 1923 broke out as a result of extremely divergent views of politics and economics 
between Wood and the Filipino leaders, underpinned inthe governor general’s post-World War I 
reform agenda that sought to reverse the state-led national development program robustly 
supported by the latter during the Harrison administration. Furthermore, it seeks to draw 
attention to the peculiarity of U.S.-Philippines relations during the colonial era, particularly the 
dynamic between “American” and “Filipino” political and economic interests, as represented by 
the governor general and the Filipino political leaders, respectively.  
 
Background: Foreign Trade and Tax Collection 
In 1916, one year before the United States entered World War I, the Philippines total 
exports was Php 139,874,365.00 of which 71,296,265.00 or 51 percent went to the U.S. Boosted 
by American entry into the War, Philippine exports increased by 37 percent to Php 
191,208,613.00in 1917.  Exports to the United States from the Philippines for 1917 totaled at Php 
131,594,061.00 or almost as much as total exports for 1916; American share jumped to two-thirds 
of Philippine exports, up 16 percentage points from the previous year (see Table no. 1). 
Ninety percent of total Philippine exports in 1917 came from four products: abaca or 
Manila hemp (49 percent of the total); coconut oil (21 percent); sugar (13 percent) and tobacco (7 
percent). Manila hemp was, on average, sold about 80 pesos higher per 1,000 kilos in the United 
States market in 1917 (Annual Report of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands, 1918, p. 
115); hemp was primarily used as rope by sea-going vessels, including the U.S. Navy. Coconut oil 
was imported by the United States for its glycerin content, which was crucial for making explosives 
(Horn, 1941, p. 221). Tobacco and sugar had been vital Philippine exports since the 18th and 19th 
centuries respectively.3 
Table No. 1: United States-Philippine Trade, 1899-1920. 
Yea
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16,26 40.35 11.35 25.54 
                                                          
3
 See Edilberto de Jesus (1980) for the origins of tobacco as an important Philippine export beginning the 
late 18
th












































































































































































































































































69.62 61.76 65.71 
Source: Kalaw (1986) 
As Philippine exports grew, albeit artificially, after the United States became involved in 
World War I, so did internal revenues in the archipelago. The Emergency Tax Law of 1915 that was 
passed called for an increase in the sales tax from 0.5 percent to 1.5 percent of the gross peso 
value of “commodities, goods, wares, and merchandise sold, bartered, exchanged, or consigned 
abroad” (Elliott, 1968, p. 155).The sales tax became a key component of the Philippine 
government’s internal revenues. Parenthetically, it must be noted that American goods entered 
the Philippines duty free;however, once duty-free products entered the domestic distribution 
chain, these goods became subject to the sales tax, seemingly a circumvention of the U.S.-
Philippines FTA. 
Internal revenue collection expanded from Php 17.85 million in 1914 ---before the 
Emergency Tax Law of 1915 was put in place--- to Php 22.63 million after the law took effect the 
following year (Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War, 1916, pp. 21-23). 
Internal revenues in 1918, one year after the United States joined World War I, stood at Php 40.8 
million, almost twice the collections of three years earlier (Golay, 1984, p. 257). 
 
Policy Shift 
Buoyed by a significant increase in trade, tax collections, and the passage in the United 
States of the Jones Law of 1916(whose preamble promised the granting of Philippine 
independence once a “stable government” was in place in the archipelago), Governor Harrison 
partnered with the Philippine Legislature to alter the development trajectory of the Philippines. 
The emphasis during the first decade and a half of American civil rule in the Philippines was on the 
role of private sector as a driver of economic growth (May, 1984, p. 132), with the government 
merely providing certain services and focused on “public improvements” (Golay, 1997, p. 112). The 
new thrust beginning in 1916, however, became that of state-led development, particularly in the 
promotion of public enterprise as seen in the emergence of a whole gamut of “national 
companies” in crucial areas of the Philippine economy (Castillo, 1936, pp. 157-177). 
Aside from the creation/purchase of national companies such as the National Coal 
Company, the National Cement Company, the Cebu Portland Cement Company, among others, the 
Harrison administration also put in place firms that were meant to systematize government 
support for these fledgling public corporations and the private sector. The most prominent 
examples of the latter group were the Philippine National Bank (PNB), created in February 1916 
via Act no. 2612 (Willis, 1917, pp. 415-416; Nagano, 1993, pp. 217-231) to provide financial 
assistance to the agricultural sector; the Manila Railroad Company (MRC), purchased from a British 
firm in 1916 to transport agricultural products from the farmlands of North and South Luzon4 to 
the international seaport of Manila; the creation of the National Development Company (NDC) in 
                                                          
4
 Luzon is the largest island in the Philippine archipelago and is home to the country’s major hemp, coconut, 
sugar and tobacco farms, as well as international port facilities in the capital city of Manila. 
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1917 via Act no. 2849 as the central (public) investor in other newly-established public 
corporations (Ybiernas, 2007, pp. 357-359). 
Andres V. Castillo (1936) explained that the shift in policy was meant for the government 
to protect the “dormant wealth” of the Philippines from foreign exploitation (pp. 157-159). Castillo 
also noted that foreigners had the advantage of “greater capital, vision and industry” over the 
Filipinos of this period and would have been the main beneficiary of the previous developmental 
policy (ibid.). Moreover, Filipino political leaders were particularly wary of growing American 
capitalist interest in the country as these would constitute a strong lobby group against Philippine 
independence promised by the Jones Law of 1916 (Manila Times, February 20, 1924).  
Capitalization for the government’s new ventures was primarily drawn from public funds. 
The PNB was undoubtedly the flagship company under the new policy. It had an initial authorized 
capitalization of Php 20 million, broken down into 200,000 shares at Php 100 per share. The 
national government was mandated by Act no. 2612 to purchase 101,000 shares while the 
remaining 99,000 shares were to be sold to the public (Willis, 1917, pp. 415-416). The bank’s initial 
asset of Php 12 million was augmented by a legal requirement set forth in Act no. 2612 that 
ordered the national, provincial and municipal governments to deposit their funds with the PNB. 
Thus, the bank’s assets ballooned to Php 249 million by the end of 1918 (Annual Report of the 
Governor General of the Philippine Islands, 1919, p. 7).  
Firms of lesser importance under the new policy received more modest support by 
contrast. The National Coal Company, created under Act no. 2705 and began operations in March 
1918, was given an initial endowment of Php 3 million from government appropriation in 1918 and 
1919 (Annual Report of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands, 1918, p. 8; Annual Report 
of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands, 1919, pp. 12-13). 
 
Growth Engine Sputters 
The inherent flaw of the new policy lay in its reliance on the commercial prosperity 
generated by American involvement in World War I. Thus, as soon as the war ended in November 
1918 with the armistice agreement in Versailles, and the United States reverted to “economic 
normalcy”,5 the Philippine economy took a nosedive. Governor Harrison noted the initial effects of 
economic normalcy in 1919: 
The sudden stoppage of war demands was a dangerous blow to the markets of the 
Philippines, with a consequent strain upon public and private finance. Prices of 
hemp and oil broke sharply, and freight rates were reduced as against staples 
shipped at prearmistice freight rates. Stocks of the commodities were forced on 
the market at a heavy loss by those interested in maintaining stability of credit 
institutions (Annual Report of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands, 
1920, p. 5). 
 
The process, nevertheless, took a while to fully mature in the Philippines. Pent-up demand 
in the United States for Philippine exports kept trade figures reasonably high, and even grew in 
1920 (see Table no. 1). Yet, the trend towards pre-war normalcy could not be overturned; its full 
impact eventually hit the Philippines in 1921. Prices for the country’s key cash crops plummeted: 
abaca from Php 50 to Php 16; sugar from Php 50 to Php 9; copra from Php 30 to Php 10 (unit of 
measurement not specified; Manila Times, July 14, 1921).  
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The drastic effects of economic normalcy on the Philippines were magnified by the policy 
changes implemented during the Harrison administration. As expected, internal revenues took a 
beating as collections in 1921 were way off target as early as the first quarter (Manila Times, 
March 17, 1921), leading to sizeable budgetary deficit for the year. The public fiscal setback was 
exacerbated by the inability of the PNB to make available government deposits. The PNB was 
simultaneously a commercial bank and custodian of public funds. As there were no statutory 
prohibition that prevented the bank from making available to borrowers the public funds 
deposited with it, the PNB lent out government moneys to private borrowers. Thus, the PNB and 
the national government became illiquid simultaneously after borrowers, mostly from the sugar 
sector, defaulted on their loans. It was of no consolation to the national government that the PNB 
took under receivership several sugar centrals after these entities defaulted on their loans; the 
national government needed liquid funds, not new assets (Ybiernas, 2012, p. 64). Consequently, 
the national government became embroiled in a debilitating fiscal and financial crisis beginning in 
1921. 
Moreover, foreign banks began to engage in financial speculation. The Insular Treasurer,6 
Dr. A.P. Fitzsimmons, noted that foreign banks began to make “large demands” for foreign 
exchange with the treasury. Fitzsimmons was told that these banks were withdrawing their 
investments from the Philippines to move them to China where the prospects for profits were 
“more promising” (Manila Times, March 6, 1921). If the Philippine peso was not pegged at the 
exchange of Php 2 to US$ 1 by the Conant Law, the value of the national currency would have 
depreciated. As it stood, the recourse of the foreign banks was to dump their Philippine peso 
holdings and demand for foreign currency to be invested elsewhere. The demand for foreign 
currency ran so high that the country’s reserves ---lowered from 100 percent to 60 percent of 
currency in circulation through the passage of Act no. 2776 on August 16, 1918--- were completely 
exhausted by June 1921 (Ybiernas, 2007, pp. 361-364). 
 
Change in Administration, Change in Policy 
In the 1920 United States presidential elections, the Republican candidate, Senator 
Warren Harding, won over the Democratic candidate, ushering in a new administration in the 
Philippines. Prior to the Harding’s appointment of a new governor to replace the Democrat 
Harrison, the president created a fact-finding mission to investigate conditions in the Philippines 
and recommend appropriate policies moving forward. Tapped to co-head the mission were Ex-
Governor W. Cameron Forbes (Harrison’s predecessor) and U.S. Army chief Major General Leonard 
Wood.  
General Wood, as co-chairman of the so-called Wood-Forbes Mission and future Governor 
General of the Philippine Islands,7 played a large role in the reforms instituted as a result of the 
post-World War I economic fallout in the archipelago. Three main questions emerged as the issue 
of economic reform was tackled by Governor Wood from 1921 and onwards: (1) financial; (2) 
fiscal; and developmental issues. 
 
Of the three, the financial issues were the least contentious and acted on with haste in 
1921. Financial reform consisted of stabilizing the currency and foreign exchange through a fresh 
                                                          
6
 Government personnel in the Philippines were often called “Insular” to distinguish them from officials from 
the United States. 
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infusion of funds (Act no. 2999); requiring the capital city of Manila to deposit public revenues 
with the Insular Treasury (Act no. 3000); establishing stricter standards for the PNB to handle and 
issue new notes (i.e., the national currency) and releasing the insular, provincial and municipal 
governments from having to deposit their funds with the said bank (Act no. 3005); and restoring 
the foreign currency reserves to a full 100 percent of currency in circulation (Act no. 3033). 
Parenthetically, it must be pointed out that these financial reforms, particularly those that 
required the outlay of funds, were financed from the proceeds resulting from the repeal by the 
United States Congress of Section 11 of the Jones Law of 1916, previously pegging public debt in 
the Philippines to Php 30 million pesos (Golay, 1997, p. 233).  
 
The question of fiscal and developmental reforms, by contrast, was most controversial. 
Unlike his predecessor, Governor Wood did not subscribe to the idea of the national government 
venturing into the sphere of private enterprise. Wood demanded the sale or dismantling of the 
numerous government corporations from the Harrison administration. Woodwas particularly 
against the huge strain on public funds the (continued) support of the government corporations 
imposed. As of 1922, the government had spent roughly Php 70 million ---nearly twice the average 
annual national budget prior to the crisis in 1921--- for these corporations: Php 30,753,400 for the 
purchase of PNB stock (an infusion of funds into the bank to make it liquid again); Php 14,127,000 
for Manila Railroad Company (MRC) stock; Php 8,000,000 for capital stock of the MRC; Php 
6,850,545.83 for interest advances on Philippine Railway Company bonds; Php 4,950,000 for 
National Development Company stock; Php 2,997,600 for National Coal Company stock; Php 
1,598,508.88 for interest advances on MRC bonds (Manila Times, March 11, 1923).  
 
For Governor Wood, developmental and fiscal reforms were intertwined; his proposed 
fiscal reforms of limiting financial support for government corporations impinged on the 
developmental framework established during the previous administration that was still supported 
by influential Filipino leaders in the legislative department. The governor leaned towards the 
liquidation of the government’s stake in these companies, not just to raise revenues at a time of 
fiscal and financial difficulty, but also to discontinue having these enterprises eat up a large chunk 
of the national budget, crisis or not. Moreover, Governor Wood expressed in his inaugural speech 
on October 15, 1921 his personal beliefs on the matter: 
The government must encourage, not discourage, private enterprise. As a general 
policy, I believe that the government should keep out of business (in Zaide, 1990, 
Volume 11, p. 198). 
 
In sum, Governor Wood wanted to scrap the developmental policies forged during the Harrison 
administration and replace it with a neo-liberal framework centered around the disposal of public 
enterprises and the reduction of public spending to essential government functions such as public 
education, health, infrastructure, and the promotion of agricultural development. In his inaugural 
speech, he said:  
 
It is my purpose, so far as lies in my power, so to conduct the government that it 
will be characterized by economy, efficiency, and true progress… 
 
Your enthusiasm and thirst for education and your accomplishments in building up 
a sound system of education is beyond praise. We must keep it up. Indeed, we 




We must push forward our public works, especially roads and irrigation. We must 
give far more attention to public health and sanitation… 
 
We must do all we can to build up a fuller appreciation of the dignity of labor; to 
increase our agriculture and push forward the development of our natural 
resources, and so organize and conduct the government that funds adequate to 
the needs of progress and development will be available. We must live within our 
income… (ibid., pp. 195-198) 
 
The Politics of Reform 
In the Republican primaries leading up to the 1920 United States presidential elections, 
U.S. Army chief Major General Leonard Wood emerged as an early frontrunner but was eventually 
overtaken by the eventual winner, Senator Harding of Ohio. Harding’s appointment of him as 
member of the Wood-Forbes Mission and later, as Governor General of the Philippine Islands, was 
seen by General Wood as the former’s thinly veiled attempt of banishing him out of the United 
States (Hoyt, 1963, p. 20).  
 
As Filipino politicians had been following American politics closely (for its possible 
ramifications to Philippine independence), they expected that Wood could not stay in the 
Philippines for long; he was projected to return to the United States soon after he became the 
governor general in order to resume his presidential quest. Thus, they were convinced that short-
term cooperation with Wood the potential candidate for the U.S. presidency made good political 
sense. This collaborative tendency manifested itself in the ease with which Wood’s financial 
reform agenda passed through the Philippine Legislature (see above). They, however, were not on 
board with Wood’s fiscal reform agenda and his neoliberal developmental framework, but were 
willing to bide their time until the governor left the Philippines. 
 
Unfortunately, as Wood spent more and more time digging into his neoliberal reform 
agenda for the Philippines, he did not seem to be headed back to the United States to contest the 
presidency anew in the 1924 elections. In fact, he seemed committed to see his neoliberal reform 
agenda through as the governor general. As such, delaying tactics for the Filipino leaders was no 
longer on the table. They were forced to confront Wood’s reform agenda and defend their 
developmental framework before it was too late. 
 
Wood, on the other hand, was probably prompted by professional courtesy and heartened 
by the support he got for his financial reform program (see above). Heactively sought to engage 
his Filipino counterparts in the legislative department to get them to support his broader reform 
framework. During the honeymoon period with the legislature, Wood was the beneficiary of an 
executive-legislative cooperative system put in place during the previous Harrison administration. 
Two of the more prominent institutions established under this cooperative system were the 
Council of State and the Board of Control. 
 
The Council of State was created when Harrison signed an executive order for this purpose 
in October 1918 (Annual Report of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands, 1919, p. 6). The 
brainchild of then-Speaker Sergio Osmeña, the Council of State was composed of senior legislators 
and cabinet members, whose task was to counsel the governor general on matters of national 
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import. The Board of Control, on the other hand, was formed through a joint resolution by the 
National Assembly and the Senate, and endorsed by Governor Harrison, as a legislative oversight 
committee over the operations of corporations owned by the government; members of this board 
were appointed by the Speaker and the Senate President from the ranks of the National Assembly 
and the Senate, respectively (Quirino, 1971, p. 136). 
 
Wood initially coursed his reform fiscal and developmental agenda ---particularly the 
liquidation of government corporations--- through the Council of State and with the consent of the 
Board of Control. It became obvious to Wood later on that both institutions ---with majority of its 
members being Filipinos who were instrumental in forging the developmental policy during the 
Harrison regime--- were not supportive of this set of reform agenda. Consequently, Wood began 
to act on his agenda unilaterally beginning with the attempted liquidation of the sugar centrals or 
haciendas under the receivership of the Philippine National Bank. 
 
Wood announced that he was willing to sell the sugar centrals to private bidders even at a 
price lower than their market value (Manila Times, February 23, 1923; Manila Times, March 9, 
1923). The governor likewise entertained the proposal of the J.G. White Company to assume 
control of the Manila Railroad Company under an “operating contract” (Annual Report of the 
Governor General of the Philippine Islands, 1923, p. 36).  
 
Filipino leaders viewed Governor Wood’s actions with great suspicion. They were alarmed 
with the chief executive’s perceived bias in favor of American businessmen in the liquidation of 
government corporations. Filipinos in government were wary of American capitalist interest in the 
country as these could potentially be a strong oppositional force to Philippine independence 
(Manila Times, February 20, 1924). Moreover, the prospects for recovery and profitability of these 
troubled government corporations were strong (see below), thus, Wood’s aggressive push to sell 
them to American business interests was deemed by the Filipinos as hasty, questionable and 
objectionable. 
 
Wood, however, had other reasons for rushing the sale of these corporations. He 
suspected that these enterprises were being used by top Filipino politicians as a vehicle for 
patronage politics. The PNB, for instance, was riddled with corruption in the form of one 
questionable loan after the other. National Assembly Minority Leader Claro M. Recto accused the 
dominant Nacionalista Party of using the bank to further its political interests (Manila Times, 
January 7, 1922). An American journalist also suggested that behest loans were granted by the 
bank to Nacionalista politicians (Mayo, 1924, p. 117). The bank’s president when it plunged to 
illiquiditywas deemed unqualified for the post by critics; it has been suggested that his close 
association with Speaker Osmeña was the only reason why he got appointed to the post (ibid., p. 
106). He was eventually arrested in Manila on June 23, 1921 for his involvement in irregular 
transactions within the bank. It must be clarified that while Speaker Osmeña was never directly 
linked to any anomalous transactions with the bank, he was often tagged as its highest patron (see 
above).   
If Osmeña was in control of the PNB, then-Senate President Manuel Quezon was thought 
of as the chief patron of the Manila Railroad Company (MRC). Speaker Osmeña, a staunch political 
opponent of Quezon at the time (they had previously been close friends prior to their well-
publicized acrimonious split in the 1920s), insinuated that the senate president had been using the 
MRC for patronage politics (Manila Times, May 5, 1922). Journalist Daniel R. Williams wrote in the 
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Manila Times at various times in 1924 that the MRC had become “a clearing house for (Quezon’s) 
political favorites” in particular, and “an adjunct of the Nacionalista Party” in general. Katherine 
Mayo (1924, pp. 121-122) went as far as saying that Quezon had issued 150,000 “travel passes” to 
supporters; each of these passes allows the recipient, his family and dependents the privilege to 
use the railroad for free for an entire year. It should also be noted that no formal accusations 
outside of the media werebrought forward against Senate President Quezon. 
 
The Economics of Reform 
As mentioned, Governor Wood wanted to sell off the government’s business enterprises 
in order to use the proceeds to raise revenues and to free the public coffers from having to 
continually support these enterprises at a time of crisis. However, in the context of a depressed 
economy, the market value of these corporations was severely undervalued. Thus, General Frank 
McIntyre, chief of the United States Bureau of Insular Affairs ---the office tasked to supervise 
Philippine affairs--- dissuaded Governor Wood against liquidating the sugar centrals held in 
receivership by the PNB (Aguilar, 1998, pp. 204-205). McIntyre supported the recommendations of 
PNB President E.W. Wilson that retention of the assets was the safest and best course to follow at 
the time, pointing out that high sugar production output in 1923 and onwards would give the 
centrals enough time to return to profitability (Annual Report of the Governor General of the 
Philippine Islands, 1924, p. 20; Manila Times, March 16, 1923; April 5, 1923).  
 
The Manila Railroad Company (MRC) also experienced financial difficulties in 1921 as a 
result of a deflated international ---chiefly, the United States--- trade market. The MRC relied 
heavily on the movement of cash crops (i.e., hemp, sugar, tobacco, etc.) from the farms to the 
seaports. Hence, a lowering of the country’s exports adversely affected MRC revenues. 
 
Unlike the PNB, the MRC was not on the brink of bankruptcy. Still, the company was 
dependent on government financial infusion for the repayment of its loans and to maintain its 
business viability. Moreover, the company was not able to pay dividends on the government’s 
stocks and interest on the bonds sold to the central government. Thus, Governor Wood moved to 
have the J.G. White Company take over the MRC under an operating contract in 1922. As 
expected, Wood’s proposal was opposed by the Filipino legislative leaders who saw the 
arrangement as a “denationalization” of the company (Annual Report of the Governor General of 
the Philippine Islands, 1923, p. 36). It must be noted that Governor Wood did not pursue suitors 
for the MRC as aggressively as he did for the PNB and the sugar centrals it held under receivership. 
After the deal with J.G. White Company fell through, there were no more alternative proposals put 
forward for the liquidation of government shares in the MRC. 
 
All in all, it can be concluded that the sale of government corporations as planned by 
Governor Wood did not succeed partly because adverse market conditions made it impractical and 
untimely. Moreover, analysts in 1923 predicted a recovery of the export market as early as the 
following year (see above). Thus, Governor Wood was forced to delay the liquidation of assets 
until the market recovered and a more favorable selling price was fetched. 
 
 
Conclusion: The Cabinet Crisis of 1923 and onwards 
The Cabinet Crisis of July 17, 1923 was precipitated by Governor-General Wood’s 
reinstatement of Detective Ray Conley, an American police officer assigned to the anti-gambling 
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squad of the Manila Police Department against the recommendations of Manila Mayor Ramon 
Fernandez and Interior Secretary Jose Laurel (Onorato, 1967, Chapter V). In protest to Wood’s 
actions, the Filipino members of the cabinet resigned en masse.  
 
However, according to the main players, the roots of the political crisis were never actually 
about Conley or his case. According to Senate President Manuel Quezon, self-confessed leader of 
the Cabinet Crisis (Quirino, 1971, p. 166): “When all these (events) can be written down calmly, it 
will be shown that in the fight with General Wood I defended not only our political autonomy but 
also our economic heritage [emphasis added].”Quezon further explained that the economic 
heritage referred to were the goverment corporations that “General Wood wanted to hand over 
to American capitalists...” (ibid.).  
 
The Cabinet Crisis broke out, fundamentally, as a result of conflict in the respective 
governmental/developmental agenda of Governor Wood and senior Filipino government officials. 
The clash is conditioned by divergent positions taken by both sides and the political and economic 
underpinnings of Governor Wood’s reform agenda. Governor Wood’s faith in his idealization of 
the government and its functions was unfaltering. He was similarly imbued by a reformist zeal 
conditioned by a gnawing suspicion that Philippine politicians were preying on government to 
pursue their patronage political objectives. His aim, as seen in his inaugural speech (see above), 
was to “conduct the government that it will be characterized by economy, efficiency, and true 
progress” and to immunize it from corrupt elements, crisis situation or not ---although there was a 
greater sense of urgency given the crisis situation. 
 
The Filipino politicians, on the other hand, viewed the American governor general as a 
temporary custodian of the Filipino state, which they will soon inherit as promised by the Jones 
Law of 1916. As such, the governor’s governmental agenda, as Governor Harrison did during his 
term of office, should align itself with Filipino interests, and not American welfare. Thus, they 
viewed with great trepidation Wood’s inclination to liquidate government assets in favor of 
American capitalists. Moreover, they did not regard the economic crisis that began in 1921 as a 
permanent situation; rather, they were confident ---as with Governor Wood--- that the crisis was 
temporary in nature and would eventually give way to economic recovery as early as 1924 (see 
above). Consequently, they did not believe that an overhaul of the existing 
governmental/developmental framework as Wood wanted was warranted. 
 
Given the obstinacy of both parties in their respective positions, the Cabinet Crisis of 1923 
was a foregone conclusion. It was created by peculiar political and economic circumstances to the 
post-World War I period in the Philippines and the agency of key historical characters such as 
Governor General Leonard Wood and Filipino politicians like Senate President Manuel Quezon and 
Speaker Sergio Osmeña, among others, pursuing their respective political and economic agenda in 
the service of their respective ideals. 
This episode exposes the peculiarity of U.S.-Philippine relations during the colonial period. 
It highlights the role of personalities in crafting and implementing policies that were meant to 
govern U.S.-Philippine relations. Thus, when Harrison became governor, he gave his assent to the 
revamp of American development policy towards the Philippines. Afterwards, when Wood 
replaced Harrison, he sought a similar change in policy, to reinstate ---if possible--- the formerly 




The flexibility of American policy towards the Philippines in this respect opened the doors 
for political dynamics to come in. It, thus, became a test of will and skill between conflicting 
parties as they maneuvered to manipulate prevailing political and economic conditions to their 
advantage. In this case, both parties manifested comparable strength of will and determination in 
support of their respective causes or even crusades, perhaps. Inevitably, the conflict was reduced 
to a matter of political skill, which the Filipino politicians proved to be adept in, especially when 
the cabinet resigneden masse to denounce the “autocracy” of Governor Wood (see “Memorial of 
Speaker Roxas and Commissioners Gabaldon and Guevara to the American Congress, January 8, 
1924” in Zaide, 1990, vol. 11, pp. 212-217). 
 
Moreover, Wood proved unable to proceed with his reform agenda once steadfastly 
opposed by Filipino politicians. He mistakenly continued to operate within the framework of the 
Council of State and the Board of Control in pursuing his reform agenda, even after the Cabinet 
Crisis of 1923. It was only in 1926 when he penned Executive Order no. 37 abolishing the Board of 
Control and when he ceased convening the Council of State that Wood showed signs of skill to 
back his resolve. Even then, Wood was stymied in his efforts by cases filed before the courts 
questioning the constitutionality of Executive Order no. 37 (Castaneda, 2001, pp. 161-163). These 
cases were pending before the judiciary when Wood returned to the United States in 1927 for 
what turned out to be an unsuccessful brain procedure. Governor Wood died in August 1927, 
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